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Police Use of Deadly Force in the Philippines: Comparing 
Levels and Patterns Before and Since Duterte
Peter Kreuzer
► Kreuzer, P. (2019). Police Use of Deadly Force in the Philippines: Comparing Levels and Patterns Before 
and Since Duterte. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 12(2), 149-166.
This article provides a detailed analysis of pre-Duterte and Duterte police use of deadly 
force in the Philippines. It first develops a set of indicators that allow for assessing the 
magnitude of police use of deadly force in “armed encounters”, its relation to the threat en-
vironments in which the police operate, and the lethality of such violence. Then, based on 
a self-developed dataset for the pre-Duterte decade and the ABS-CBN dataset on Duterte 
period police killings, it establishes the past and current patterns of police use of deadly 
force. The analysis shows that in the past decade as under Duterte inter-provincial spatial 
and temporal variation of police use of deadly force has been very high. Differences in 
the threat environment play only a minor role in explaining this variation. Differences in 
sub-national units’ reactions to the Duterte campaign mirror those in police use of deadly 
force during the earlier decade, signaling strong path-dependency. Lethality-levels have 
been outstanding in both periods despite dramatically differing levels of lethal violence. 
Clearly, Philippine police tended to shoot-to-kill already before Duterte granted them a 
carte blanche.
Keywords: Duterte; Philippines; Police Killings; Police Use of Force; Police Violence 

INTRODUCTION
The history of the modern Philippines is also a history of political violence that 
comes in many forms. The Philippines still harbors a revolutionary movement 
that challenges the state. The long-standing ethnopolitical armed conflict seems 
currently to be coming to an end after half a century of intermittent fighting. 
Further, the Philippines stands out with respect to less prominent forms of polit-
ical violence in Southeast Asia. Despite being the oldest democracy in the region, 
Philippine elections are regularly accompanied by the killing of officeholders, 
candidates, and political supporters; not to mention that the Philippines are the 
regional front-runner with respect to killed journalists, political activists, and 
human rights defenders. Finally, one should also mention that the Philippines 
have by far the highest homicide rate in Southeast Asia. Taken together, these 
observations signal that by regional standards the Philippines seem to have a 
multidimensional problem of violence.
Whereas the spatial and temporal patterns of most of the above-mentioned forms 
of violence are fairly well documented, police use of deadly force against criminal 
suspects has escaped public and scholarly attention almost completely in the past. 
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This has only changed recently, when Rodrigo Duterte instigated a vast anti-drug-crime 
campaign as he took over as president of the Philippines on 30 June 2016. Reports on 
campaign-like killings of criminal suspects focused almost completely on the dirty work 
of death squads that were generally perceived to have been instigated and led by local 
politicians and manned to a significant extent by moonlighting policemen. This made the 
everyday violence perpetrated by the police under the label of “armed encounter” largely 
invisible in the media. With the Philippine National Police (PNP) proudly reporting suc-
cess measured not only by the number of arrests, but also by the number of suspects 
killed in “legitimate encounters”, police use of deadly force became a prominent subject 
of public discourse. 
Yet, attention is mostly focused on the obvious, on the monstrous phenomenon that 
catches the eye. A number of questions are largely left unanswered: What was the magni-
tude of police use of deadly force before Duterte? What did its spatial dispersal look like? 
How much did violent police behavior increase under Duterte as compared to earlier 
police use of force? Do we see much path-dependency, or do sub-national units react dif-
ferently from what might be expected on account of their past records of police violence? 
To what extent do magnitude as well as spatial and temporal variations of violence relate 
to objective factors of threat and danger to which policemen are exposed to different 
degrees in varying environments? And, how many of the killings do not result from self-
defense, but must be categorized as extra-judicial killings? Some of these questions have 
been left unanswered for lack of empirical data, others for want of a suitable approach.
When answers are provided these are generally based on analyses of a small number 
of cases. Whether these are representative of the general situation or rather exceptions is 
as unclear as whether there is one general pattern of police use of deadly force and not 
an array of different local patterns. 
This article intends to fill these gaps by providing a comprehensive analysis of armed 
encounters between the PNP and (supposedly) armed suspects on the sub-national level 
from 2006 until 2018. Spatial and temporal analyses allow for the creation of a detailed 
map of such violence that uncovers patterns that are lost in works based on small samples 
of rather prominent cases, as for example studies on earlier vigilantism in Davao under 
Duterte, in Cebu City under mayor Tomas Osmeña, or in other cities and municipalities 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009). These patterns also escape most analyses of current police 
violence under Duterte that tend to miss the extraordinary spatial and temporal variation 
in the concrete patterns police deadly use of force takes in the various provinces of the 
Philippines. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes literature on 
police violence in the Philippines. Section three introduces the concepts and indicators 
that I use to analyze police violence. Section four describes the datasets used in the 
analysis. Finally, in section five I investigate the temporal and spatial patterns of pre-
Duterte and Duterte police violence as well as the role of the threat and the lethality of 
PNP use of deadly force. 
POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Even though police use of deadly force is a regularly reported by Philippine media, it 
has been largely ignored by social scientific research. In general, it has been subsumed 
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under the broader heading of extralegal, summary, and arbitrary executions by human 
rights groups, as for example by the Free Legal Assistance Group (2007) and the spe-
cial report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Philip Alston (2008a, 2008b, 2009), which, however, gave prom-
inence to violence exerted against journalists, human rights defenders, and social 
activists (see also, Parreño, 2011). Studies that focused on violence against suspected 
criminals focused exclusively on the phenomenon of death squad killings (Breuil & 
Rozema, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Picardal, 2016). Karapatan, a left-wing 
NGO that provides the most comprehensive account of state-perpetrated violence 
likewise does not cover fatal violence against criminal suspects in its statistics1. One 
of the first studies to explicitly take note of this specific form of violence was a study 
on the role of violence in upholding domination by political families in Pampanga 
(Kreuzer, 2012) that established a typology of “top-down violence” that included police 
shoot-outs as a distinct category (Kreuzer, 2012, pp. 24-26). Even prominent “armed 
encounters” as the one in Atimonan (Quezon province) in 2013, in which 13 suspected 
members of a drug syndicate were summarily killed by combined forces of the PNP 
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) at a checkpoint, did not elicit serious 
scientific interest, even though in this case a forensic report by the Philippine National 
Bureau of Investigation concluded: “The apparent objective of the operation was to 
kill all the victims” (National Bureau of Investigation, 2013, p. 49). 
It is no exaggeration to argue that scholarly research on police killings in the 
Philippines started with the Duterte campaign in 2016. In late 2016, Reyes (2016) and 
Curato (2016) offered two analyses that both focus on the phenomenological side of 
the current campaign. Both address the seeming paradox that a policy that victimizes 
thousands of people apparently has enduring public support. Whereas Curato (2016) 
links this to penal populism, Reyes (2016) conceives of police killings as spectacles 
of violence conveying the message that certain people do not belong to the people 
and can (or should) be killed in order to “enhance personal safety, public safety and 
law and order, which is very appealing to ordinary people who experienced insecu-
rity in their daily lives” (Reyes, 2016, p. 118). Sheila Coronel (2017) sets out from a 
different vantage point that focuses closely on the economic logic underlying police 
perpetrated killings of suspects. She argues that, under Duterte, police-officers are 
rewarded with money and promotions if they meet the president’s demands; theft 
of victims’ belongings during police operations is tolerated as is extortion from drug 
suspects. She concludes that to many police officers, the drug-war has become a 
thriving business. Linking the present to reports of past police involvement in crime, 
she also argues that police officers directly profit from the new opportunities to neu-
tralize opponents in various spheres of illegal business. According to her, “Duterte’s 
drug war was waged by a police force accustomed to extortion and execution”, a force 
that embraced the opportunity provided by Duterte’s policy “as entrepreneurs look-
ing for maximum gain” (Coronel, 2017, p. 189). Her argument is given a further twist 
by Jensen and Hapal (2018). They provide an analysis of past and present police prac-
tice in the largest barangay2 of the Philippines, located in Quezon City, that harbors 
1 http://www.karapatan.org
2 Smallest administrative division in the Philippines.
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a large community of urban poor. They argue that violent police coercion should be 
interpreted as a specific activity in exchange relationships that link the police to the 
(poor) local communities. In the past, selective extralegal killings provided the iron 
fist behind a normally smoothly working system that allowed police officers to extort 
money from suspects in exchange for release. Duterte’s war on drugs “reconfigured 
the parameters of these relationships” to the advantage of the police, as “the price of 
survival seems to have gone up significantly” (Jensen & Hapal, 2018, pp. 57-58). 
While these studies are insightful with respect to certain dynamics driving police 
violence, it is still largely unclear in how far the observed patterns are representative 
for the Philippines. Further, the extent as well as the temporal and spatial variation 
of pre-Duterte police use of deadly force is not dealt with. 
In June 2018, David, Mendoza, Atun, Cossid, and Soriano (2018) published the first 
quantitative analysis of the lethal violence associated with the anti-drug campaign 
from May 2016 to September 2017. Their core results closely tally the analysis below. 
My analysis goes further in two respects: It extends to July 2018 and includes the pro-
vincial level, whereas David et al.’s (2018) analysis focuses on the regional level only. 
They conclude that lethal police (and vigilante) violence is distributed highly unevenly 
with the vast majority of killings happening in the National Capital Region (NCR)3 and 
the directly adjacent regions 3 and 4a (see, Figure 1). Like the ABS-CBN News (n.d.) 
dataset employed in this study (see below), David et al. (2018) only list the numbers of 
suspects killed but neither the number of the suspects wounded nor the police officers 
killed or wounded. Their dataset further does not allow to draw any conclusions about 
continuity and change from pre-Duterte to Duterte-period police use of deadly force.
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING AND EVALUATING POLICE USE OF (DEADLY) FORCE
Indicators for three core dimensions of police violence that allow for a fairly com-
prehensive mapping will be established: indicators for measuring magnitude, threat 
level to which police officers are exposed, and lethality of police violence. These rest 
on initial efforts of Paul Chevigny (1990, 1991), which, however, have only sporadical-
ly been used in research on police violence during the past decades. 
A first scale for measuring the magnitude of police violence parallels the one used for 
measuring crime: police use of deadly force in relation to population (suspects killed 
per million inhabitants). A second scale, number of suspects killed divided by crimi-
nal killings, takes into account the abstract threat faced by police officers depending 
on the environment in which they operate. It assumes that police officers who oper-
ate in a dangerous environment (based on the ratio of murder and homicides per 
million population) will be more prone to use potentially deadly force than police 
officers who operate in peaceful environments. This second indicator of the relative 
magnitude of police violence already factors in one core explanation or justification 
for lethal police violence: the potential threat to which police officers are exposed. In 
so far it serves a dual purpose: to establish a relative scale for magnitude and simulta-
neously provide an answer to the question of whether police violence is a reaction to 
the objective threat level of the environment. 
3 That is, Metropolitan Manila.
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This dimension of ‘threat’ can be further specified by focusing on the direct threat 
experienced by police officers in a given environment, that is, the number of police 
officers that have been or are currently victimized in encounters in relation to the size 
of the police force (police officers killed/police force). This scale can be broadened by 
also considering how many police officers have been wounded in armed encounters 
(police officers wounded/police force). 
The final two scales focus on the levels of lethality of police use of force in armed 
encounters. Here the core assumptions come, on the one hand, from the legal frame-
works for police use of force that stress that use of force has to be reasonable and is 
legitimate only to avert imminent threats to the lives and well-being of the police 
officers or other persons. On the other hand, if police shoot-to-kill only in situations 
of self-defense in armed encounters, and when reports regularly state that suspects 
fired first, then one should assume a certain number of killed or wounded victims on 
the side of the police too. These two assumptions can be translated into two indicators 
for the lethality of police violence. First, given a large number of armed encounters, 
the absence or extraordinarily low numbers of killed or wounded police-officers sig-
nals excessive violence. This makes the ratio of suspects killed to police officers killed 
in such encounters a strong indicator for or against the assumption of extralegal kill-
ings as a prevalent police-practice. A second indicator for assessing the lethality of 
police use of force operationalizes the duty to apply only the minimum requirement 
of force necessary to subdue the threat. If this is the case, the number of suspects 
wounded should be higher than the number of suspects killed, given a sufficient 
number of cases. Otherwise, as Chevigny (1991) argues, one should “infer that deadly 
force is being abused” (p. 191). This leaves us with the following five indicators for the 
categorization and evaluation of police use of lethal force: 
Indicator Measurement
Absolute magnitude
suspects killed
million population
Relative magnitude
Abstract threat
suspects killed
criminal killings
Concrete threat
killed police officers
size of police force
Lethality and threat
suspects killed
police officers killed
Lethality as expression of
shoot-to-kill practice
suspects killed
suspects wounded
A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE DATASETS
For the analysis of Duterte period police violence in armed encounters, I rely on a 
dataset established by ABS-CBN News (n.d.). While being by far the most detailed and 
Table 1. Indicators of Police Use of Deadly Force.
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precise documentation of current police-violence since May 2016, it neither allows 
for a comparison of police deadly to non-deadly use of violence, nor does it allow an 
assessment of the threat to which police officers are exposed in such encounters as it 
only documents the number of suspects killed by the police, but not the victims on 
the side of the police, nor does it document armed encounters in which nobody is 
hurt or killed. One small remedy for this problem is a detailed analysis of the data for 
one province, Bulacan, for which a high-quality dataset based on the provincial PNP 
operation reports was established.
The dataset used for the analysis of the pre-Duterte decade from 2006 to 2015 has 
been developed during the past years by the author. Similar to the ABS-CBN News 
(n.d.) dataset or the The Washington Post (n.d.) and The Guardian (n.d.) datasets on 
police violence in the United States, it relies on extensive online media research in 
both English and Filipino, covering not only national, but also local media. 
Coded were 11 regions of the Philippines. The regions are broadly representative 
for the regional variation of the Philippines, with a slight overrepresentation of highly 
urbanized areas and the Luzon island group due to the inclusion of the NCR that, 
with nearly 13 million inhabitants, is by far the largest urban agglomeration in the 
Philippines. The dataset includes regions that encompass approximately 70% of the 
Philippine population. In order to ensure comparability of the data, the analysis be-
low will only cover those regions that have been included in both datasets, that is, the 
NCR; regions 1, 3, 4a, and 4b belonging to the island group Luzon; regions 6, 7, and 
8 belonging to the Visayas island group; and regions 10 and 11, both of which belong 
to the Mindanao island group. The initial search was performed as a Google search 
with the search term “police shoot-out” in various spellings and the provincial name 
on an annual basis. In many cases the names of cities were also utilized, especially, 
when these were self-governing and not part of the adjacent or surrounding prov-
ince, as in the cases of Angeles City (surrounding province: Pampanga) or Olongapo 
(adjacent to Zambales province). Sources encompass a total of 65 national and local 
news-outlets. Wherever possible, a second search of the archives of individual news-
papers was conducted with the same search terms. By including local outlets like the 
Mindanao Times, Panay News, the Visayan Daily Star, or Tarlac Today, chances were 
maximized to detect also those cases that escaped the attention of the national media, 
like the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Manila Standard, or the Philippine Star. Coding 
was by province and year. Four categories for coding the individual incidents were 
applied: suspects killed; suspects wounded; police-officers killed; and police officers 
wounded. News that reported shoot-outs with no victims were also included.4 As the 
PNP does not provide any data on police shoot-outs or the number of victims, corrob-
oration of the data is problematic. However, the provincial PNP of Bulacan province 
has for the past years provided detailed accounts for all its major operations that run 
into several hundred pagers for each year (Bulacan Philippine National Police, n.d.).5 A 
4 For further details on the datasets, the news-media, and the coding, see the electronic appendix at: 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CBR3G3. 
5 This source has been discontinued in July 2019. The content was erased shortly afterwards. Since Sep-
tember 2019, the website is “under construction”. The most recent version that can still be accessed via 
the internet archive WayBack Machine provides data to April 2019. The shift in policy seems to have been 
triggered by an Amnesty International Report (2019, p. 10) claiming that Central Luzon and specifically 
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comparison (Table 2) shows that the results of the media analysis closely fit the num-
bers of suspects killed in armed encounters as reported by the provincial police. The 
extraordinarily low number reported by the PNP for 2013 may be a result of a different 
“publication policy” of the then provincial police director. This hypothesis would fit a 
drastic change in spring 2018, when the formerly detailed reporting was temporarily 
discontinued after a new police director took office. Initially, the Bulacan PNP shifted 
to news provided by the Philippine News Agency that omitted many of the Bulacan 
operations. It is only since the end of July 2018 that the provincial news by the local 
PNP is back with considerable detail on police operations.
2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulacan PNP 17 2 15 40
Own data 19 7 13 38
DETAILING PHILIPPINE POLICE VIOLENCE
The indicators established above will now be applied to the two datasets on Philippine 
police-violence. First, I will provide an analysis of the magnitude of police encoun-
ter-violence that also allows for a mapping of temporal and spatial variation on the 
provincial level. Then, I will analyze whether threat provides a plausible explanation 
for police use of deadly force, followed by an account of the lethality of police vio-
lence. Finally, I will place Duterte and pre-Duterte police violence in international 
comparison to assess its ‘severity’.
Sub-National Magnitudes of Police Use of Deadly Force Before and Under Duterte
A detailed analysis of available data for the two periods before and under Duterte 
yields three types of key information: first, the change in overall numbers; second, 
variation in sub-national magnitude of violence during the two phases; and third, 
the relationship between the pre-Duterte and Duterte ranking of provinces and cities 
with respect to deadly police violence. 
In the 11 regions analyzed, a total of 1,744 suspects were killed by the police in 
armed encounters in the decade from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 1). However, this violence 
was split very unevenly across the various regional and sub-regional units. Adjusted 
to population, the highest levels of deadly police violence could be observed in the 
NCR and the directly adjoining regions 3 and 4a. However, even within these regions, 
variation was high with outstanding levels for Manila and Quezon City.
The corresponding number to the 174 suspects killed per year in the sample re-
gions from 2006 to 2015 is a staggering 1,202 persons killed per year for the first 25 
months under Duterte (with a total 2,506 suspects killed from July 2016 to July 2018 
Bulacan province have become the “epicenter of killings” in the Philippines directly implicating provincial 
police director Bersaluna of complicity. 
Table 2. Police Use of Deadly Force 2012-2015 in Bulacan. (Bulacan Philippine National 
Police, n.d.; own compilation).
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in the 11 regions; Figure 2), based on the ABS-CBN News (n.d.) data. This is a rise by 
590%. Yet, the distribution of violence remained rather stable. The vast majority of 
police use of deadly force adjusted to population occurred in the same regions: the 
NCR and the adjacent regions 3 and 4a. Again, within-region variation is high. 
Figure 1. Suspects Killed per Year per Million Population 2006-2015. (Own compilation).
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Figure 2. Suspects Killed per Year per Million Population from July 2016 to July 2018. 
ABS-CBN News, n.d.; dataset and 2015 census by Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016; own 
compilation).
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Despite some variation between pre-Duterte and Duterte patterns of police use 
of deadly force, overall path-dependency is very strong. The Spearman rank correla-
tion coefficient reveals a high and statistically highly significant correlation between 
pre-Duterte and Duterte violence levels (rs=0.728; n=69; p<0.000001).6 Put simply, 
this means that while levels of violence changed dramatically, in general, the sub-
regional units reacted as could be expected on the basis of their prior patterns. The 
scatterplot7 further reveals a broad variation in the reaction to Duterte’s war on drugs 
amongst those units that had the lowest levels of police violence during the preced-
ing decade (Figure 3). Nine of them did not react at all: from Batanes, the north-
ernmost province of the Philippines, to Quirino, Marinduque, Romblon, Guimaras, 
Siquijor, Eastern Samar, and Camiguin to Davao Occidental at the southern end of 
Mindanao. All of them are rather small and remote areas with rather small numbers 
of inhabitants. This also holds true, albeit to a lesser degree, for the following units 
of Capiz (6), Ilocos Sur (7), and Northern Samar (8) that also reacted rather weakly to 
the Duterte-campaign. Variation among the others is very strong, with one (Pateros 
in the NCR) rising from zero before to one of the top-scorers under Duterte.
This suggests that peripheral location may be one factor that explains lackluster 
response to the Duterte campaign. However, a number of provinces near or compo-
nent cities of the NCR also reacted rather hesitantly (Las Pinas, Taguig, and Makati 
City, all in the NCR, or Tarlac in region 3), whereas other rather peripheral areas that 
earlier had exhibited low levels of violence before Duterte reacted vigorously (e.g., La 
Union, Isabela, Palawan). 
6 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is the numerical expression of the relationship between two 
rank orders. It measures the strength and direction of this relationship. The maximum value of 1 signals 
a perfect positive and -1 a perfect negative correlation of the ranks of the two variables. Values around 0 
indicate a lack of correlation between the rank-orders of the two variables.  
7  Tied ranks at the lowest levels (0) have been adjusted to 0 with a similar reduction of all corresponding 
ranks.
Figure 3. Comparing the Ranks With Respect to Suspects Killed per Million Population per 
Year 2006-2015 and from July 2016 to July 2018. (Own calculation).
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These preliminary results signal that explanations for police violence must go 
beyond uniform assumptions for the Philippines or the PNP. They show that there 
were options for local executives and police commanders to resist or at least dilute the 
Duterte government’s centrally propagated policy advocating the killing of suspects. 
Before turning to the temporal variation in police use of deadly force, it should be 
analyzed whether police officers’ use of deadly violence varied with the danger ema-
nating from the environment in which they operate. This ratio had to be established 
on the regional level as there are no data on murder and homicide available for the 
past decade on the sub-regional level. 
Data on murder and homicide are only available for the years 2006 and 2014 on 
the regional level. The corresponding Spearman rank correlation shows a rather 
surprising result: a negative (albeit non-significant) correlation (rs=-0.5364; n=11; 
p two-tailed=0.088). A similar correlation for the year 2017 yields no correlation at all 
(rs=-0.1091; n=11; p two-tailed=0.749). Even though data availability with respect to 
this dimension is only partially satisfying, it suffices to discount the assumption that 
higher levels of police violence are a result of police officers having to work in a more 
threatening environment.
Temporal Variation of Deadly Police Use of Force 
Another important result of the analysis of the Philippine data on deadly police vio-
lence refers to temporal variation. While there are various different temporal patterns 
of variation with respect to deadly police violence on the sub-regional level, they add 
up to a wave-like pattern both for the decade before and the first 25 months under 
Duterte (Figures 4 and 5). 
Whereas in the decade before Duterte the consecutive waves entail an underlying 
rise of deadly police violence of more than 120%, the Duterte period police campaign 
against drug-related crime until July 2018 saw an overall decline of deadly police vio-
lence from its initial heights during the first few months after Duterte’s inauguration 
as president. Yet, even during the second year from August 2017 to July 2018, deadly 
Figure 4. Suspects killed per Year 2006-2015. (Own compilation).
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police violence was still substantially higher than during any of the pre-Duterte years. 
Despite this caveat, it is important to note that current levels of police use of deadly 
force are slowly diminishing even though the rhetoric of the government’s anti-drug-
crime campaign has not changed. 
Considering the short-term spikes and the long-term pre-Duterte trend of ris-
ing police violence, it is clear that Duterte ‘only’ amplified a pre-existing trend of 
enhanced police use of deadly force. The low tides in the years 2007, 2010, and 2013 
suggest that under ‘normal’ circumstances there may be a link between the Philippine 
electoral cycle and deadly police use of force, as all three years have been election 
years, during which the police has been busy in preventing election violence during 
the periods preceding and succeeding the elections. 
Underlying these cumulative trends are various types of temporal variation at the 
local level that defy a uniform explanation. They again point to the need to take a 
closer look at local-level politics as a potentially crucial dimension for the explana-
tion of both the magnitude of police use of deadly force and its variation.
The Influence of Environmental Threat on Police Use of Deadly Force
As detailed in the introduction, at first sight it seems sensible that police use of 
deadly force should depend on the type of environment in which the police operate. 
Environments characterized by higher levels of threat to the life and well-being of the 
police officers should elicit higher levels of deadly police violence, as police officers 
should tend to resort to violence in a number of situations that would warrant non-vi-
olent strategies in more peaceful environments. This abstract ‘threat hypothesis’ has 
already been tested and discounted above. Clearly, in the Philippines higher levels of 
deadly crime (murder and homicide) are not associated with higher levels of use of 
deadly force by a police force that reacts to a more hostile environment. 
A second and more precise option for evaluating the relevance of threat for police 
behavior is to establish the ratio of police officers killed in relation to the strength of 
the police force, on the one hand, and correlate this with the respective ratio of police 
use of deadly force against suspects, on the other hand. This is possible only for the 
Figure 5. Suspects Killed per Month From July 2016 to July 2018. (ABS-CBN News, n.d.).
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component segments of the NCR for the years 2011 to 2015. However, a Spearman 
rank correlation only shows a very weak and statistically not significant positive re-
lationship (rs=0.2519; n=17; p two-tailed=0.328). The scatterplot (Figure 6) likewise 
shows no relation between these two variables. 
Given the rudimentary data, all that can be said is that police tend to use higher 
levels of deadly violence if there has been at least one victim on the side of the police 
during the past years. 
Clearly there is significant need for additional research about the relationship be-
tween threat experienced by the police and their predilection to use deadly violence. 
The rough analysis above suggests that police threat-experience is no predictor of 
police use of deadly force against suspects.
The Lethality of Philippine Police Violence Before and Under Duterte
While information on the magnitude of police violence provides initial indicators 
for assessing whether such violence is excessive and may be characterized as masked 
extra-legal killing, this question is best dealt with by analyzing the precise patterns 
of police shoot-outs with respect to the numbers and ratios of victims on both sides. 
Unfortunately, the ABS-CBN News (n.d.) dataset does not provide the necessary data 
for the Duterte period as it only documents suspects killed. Therefore, the following 
analysis is confined to pre-Duterte armed police-encounters. However, an illustra-
tive analysis will be added on the province of Bulacan, as the provincial police of 
Bulacan reports in detail on its daily operations, which allows for the establishment 
of a respective dataset. 
As argued above, an initial indicator of the lethality of police violence is the ratio 
between suspects and police officers killed in so-called armed encounters. If encoun-
ters are ‘real’ and suspects actually target police officers, as is regularly asserted in 
police depictions of the incidents, then one should expect a non-trivial number of 
Figure 6. Relation Between Police Use of Deadly Force and Direct Threat to the Life of Police 
Officers in the NCR 2011-2015. (National Competitiveness Council Philippines, n.d.; own 
compilation).
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victims on the police side. However, for the overall set of 69 provinces and cities the 
online search could document a total of 1,744 suspects killed, whereas only 50 police 
officers died in the encounters (or a ratio of 34.88 suspects killed for each victim-
ized police officer) in the ten years from 2006 to 2015. This already excessive ratio 
hides extreme cases like Bulacan province (146/1), Manila City (243/3), Quezon City 
(391/4), Rizal (98/1), or Davao del Sur including Davao City (51/0). There were a total 
of 43 provinces with no victims on the police side, of which 24 had also no reports 
on suspects killed. These results illustrate that there is a clear problem of excessive 
police violence, which, however, is not uniformly present in the Philippines but con-
centrated in some regions. 
An even more obvious proof of a regionally established shoot-to-kill policy is pro-
vided by the analysis of the relationship between suspects killed and wounded by 
the police. As argued above, the numbers of wounded must in any case exceed the 
number of killed, if one is to assume that police officers make use of reasonable force 
to avert imminent danger. However, the actual overall ratio for the ten years from 
2006 to 2015 stands at 1,744 suspects killed against only 96 wounded or a staggering 
18.2 killed suspects for each wounded. Again, the overall number masks dramatic 
differences on the local level. Extreme cases are again Bulacan (146/3), Rizal (98/1), 
Davao del Sur including Davao City (51/0), but also Laguna (101/3) and Caloocan 
(46/1), Pampanga including Angeles City (54/0), or Tarlac (46/0). There is not a single 
province with more reported suspects wounded than killed. 
These results show that although the absolute number of police deadly use of 
force was much lower before Duterte’s anti-drug campaign, the past “legal encoun-
ters” were already utilized as a legally masked means to kill suspects, or one might say 
as the administering of an ‘informal death penalty’.
This continued unabated under Duterte as the scarce information provided by 
the PNP suggests. The PNP reported 68 police officers killed and 184 wounded for the 
period from 1 July 2016 to 26 July 2017. For the same period, they reported 3,451 “drug 
personalities who died in anti-drug operations” (Philippine National Police, n.d.). 
While these data only comprise the drug-war related shootings, the ratio of 50.75 
suspects killed for each police officer killed is worse than the corresponding ratio of 
pre-Duterte police violence. An analysis of the operation reports of the Bulacan PNP 
for the year from June 2017 to May 2018 reveals a total of 250 suspects killed in police 
operations (including August 2018 the number rises to 291). However, the reports 
only mention two suspects wounded. In the same period, one police officer was killed 
and three reportedly wounded. This makes for a ratio of 250/1 for suspects to police 
officers killed and a ratio of 125/1 for suspects killed to wounded. While one may at 
first sight assume that non-fatal injuries have been underreported, this most prob-
ably is not the case as even slight injuries of police officers were reported. Of the three 
injured policemen (all in one encounter) one was reportedly shot in the foot, whereas 
another “sustained minor injury on its [sic] right eyebrow” and the third “a minor 
injury on his left eyelid” (Bulacan Philippine National Police, 2017). The Bulacan 
PNP data reveal a further important detail on deadly police use of force: There is an 
almost complete separation between operations in which all suspects are killed and 
operations in which the suspects are arrested, but none is killed or wounded. Opera-
tions with mixed results are almost completely absent. This suggests that at least in 
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Bulacan and during the Duterte presidency it is generally decided in advance whether 
an operation aims at arresting or killing the target persons. One final stunning point 
should be mentioned: In Bulacan more people have been killed by the police than 
killed intentionally otherwise (188/181) – at least for the ten months from September 
2017 to May 2018 and the month of August 2018.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This article provided a comprehensive analysis of deadly police violence in the 
Philippines. It established detailed data for the analysis and comparison of pre-
Duterte and Duterte violence that also allow for a comparison to other countries. 
The past two years of police violence under Duterte brought a dramatic rise in 
violence. However, the temporal analysis showed that this violence evolved in slowly 
abating waves following the initial climax during the first months after Duterte’s 
inauguration as president. This suggests that even under a strongman-president as 
Duterte the Philippines may return to the much lower levels of deadly police violence 
in the next years. The slow, but fairly constant, rise of police violence during the 
earlier decade from 2006 to 2015 demonstrated that the dramatic increase in deadly 
police violence under Duterte was based on a longer trend that may have facilitated 
the quick response to Duterte’s ‘invitation to kill’ suspects. 
The analysis of sub-national data revealed a huge amount of variation between 
sub-national units and fairly high levels of path-dependency of sub-national units. 
Those that had high levels of police use of deadly force before reacted more strongly 
under Duterte, whereas others hardly reacted at all. These differences did not corre-
spond to levels of murder and homicide. This suggests that variations of the threat 
factor emanating from different environments in which police officers operate does 
not play an important role in explaining different levels of police use of deadly force. 
Taken together, these results suggest the need for further analysis that takes into 
account the provincial level and below. The host of variation in reaction to Duterte’s 
‘license-to-kill’ and the at times significant variation of police violence in single 
units over time suggests that local political determinants should be given additional 
attention in research. In the Philippine context of “bossism” (Sidel, 1999), one obvi-
ous starting point would be the analysis of the attitudes of local chief executives, 
their relationship to the municipal and provincial police directors,8 and the dynamics 
of electoral political competition at the local level. Coronel’s (2017) and Jensen and 
Hapal’s (2018) focus on the (most probably uneven) entanglement of local politicians 
and police in illegal business might provide an alternative angle which may allow for 
8 This seems a crucial vantage point as in actual practice local executives wield enormous influence over 
the local police at their respective levels, an influence only insufficiently visible in the already rather broad 
powers granted by Section 51 of Republic Act No. 6975 (Congress of the Philippines, 1990) that inter 
alia grants the following powers to local executives: to choose the local police director from a shortlist; 
to exercise operational supervision and control of PNP units; to impose disciplinary penalties for minor 
offenses committed by members of the PNP; to recommend the transfer, reassignment, or detail of PNP 
members as well as recommend the appointment of new members of the PNP. These powers have been 
further strengthened in the past decades by the PNP Reform Act (No. 8551, Sections 62, 63; Congress of 
the Philippines, 1998). In addition, the local government units shoulder a non-trifling part of the operating 
expenses of the local PNP units.
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making sense of the overall magnitude of police use of deadly force as compared to 
the Philippines’ neighbors and its subnational spatial and temporal variation. 
The final dimension analyzed was the lethality of police violence before and 
during the Duterte presidency. Despite huge differences in the magnitude of police 
violence in armed encounters, the Philippines (or, more precisely, many regions 
of the Philippines) have been outstanding both before and under Duterte. In both 
periods, the ratios of suspects killed per police officer killed and suspects killed per 
suspect wounded clearly show that in most regions the PNP takes no risk when con-
fronting suspects and shoots-to-kill instead of applying the minimum amount of 
force necessary to overcome resistance. In the rather calm decade before Duterte, 
the lethality rate stood at 18.2 suspects killed for any single suspect wounded and at 
125 for Bulacan in the year from June 2017 to May 2018. This is much worse than the 
respective data for Mexico, a country engulfed in a notorious war on drugs. There, 
the respective ratio of suspects killed to wounded stood at 6.6 on average for the years 
2008 to 2014 (Forné, Correa, & Rivas, n.d.). 
This article aimed at laying the foundation for and stimulating more research on 
police violence in the Philippines that goes beyond the preoccupation with the cur-
rent surge under Rodrigo Duterte. It showed that crucial dimensions of present-day 
police violence have their precursors in past practices. Most importantly, this article 
established that it is problematic to analyze police violence as if it were a rather uni-
form phenomenon given the huge amount of spatial and temporal variation before 
and during the Duterte presidency. Future research should especially focus on the 
catalysts at the local level that may either amplify or inhibit such violence. It should 
also focus on explanations for the extraordinarily high lethality rate of Philippine 
police use of force in ‘armed encounters’ which could be ascertained irrespective of 
the actual magnitude of such violence. Finally, it is important to add a comparative 
perspective to this research that aims at relating the Philippines to other countries in 
order to better establish a yardstick for evaluating the past and present seriousness of 
the problem of police use of deadly force.
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